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CORPORATE DARWINISM: DISCIPLINING 
MANAGERS IN A WORLD WITH WEAK 
SHAREHOLDER LITIGATION* 
JAMES D. COX** & RANDALL S. THOMAS*** 
Because representative shareholder litigation has been 
constrained by numerous legal developments, the corporate 
governance system has developed new mechanisms as alternative 
means to address managerial agency costs. We posit that recent 
significant governance developments in the corporate world are 
the natural consequence of the ineffectiveness and inefficiency of 
shareholder suits to address certain genre of managerial agency 
costs. We thus argue that corporate governance responses evolve 
to fill voids caused by the inability of shareholder suits to 
monitor and discipline corporate managers. 
We further claim that these new governance responses are 
themselves becoming stronger due in part to the rising 
concentration of share ownership of public companies. Share 
ownership has steadily evolved so that there are now a significant 
number of large blockholders at most public companies. This 
growing concentration of ownership in public companies has the 
twin effects of reducing the costs of collective action and 
increasing the likelihood that an owner exists who will have a 
sufficient economic interest to embrace improved governance as 
a wealth-increasing strategy. 
Finally, the increasing concentration of ownership of public 
companies has the effect of making governance responses 
efficient and effective, a response that would not have been 
observed were ownership not concentrated. Thus, we not only 
argue that concentration increases activism among this growing 
group of blockholders but also that concentrated ownership 
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ushers in new methods to address agency costs and makes those 
methods effective. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Corporate legal scholarship is riveted on addressing managerial 
agency costs.1 Adolf Berle and Gardner Means popularized the topic 
by documenting how in the 1930s the ownership of U.S. public 
companies was separated from management, resulting in a 
misalignment of utility curves between owners and managers.2 
 
 1. See Eugene F. Fama, Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm, 88 J. POL. 
ECON. 288, 289 (1980) (explaining how the “separation of security ownership and control” 
functions as “an efficient form of economic organization”); Oliver E. Williamson, 
Transaction-Cost Economics: The Governance of Contractual Relations, 22 J.L. & ECON. 
233, 234 (1979) (affirming the centrality of transaction costs to economics and providing an 
in-depth analysis of them). 
 2. ADOLF A. BERLE & GARDNER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND 
PRIVATE PROPERTY 66, 112–13 (1932) (explaining that the typical public corporate 
owners were dispersed so that owners’ exercise of oversight was seriously limited by high 
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Michael Jensen and William Meckling later showed that within 
dispersed ownership systems, shareholders engage in a variety of 
strategies so as to minimize these divergences.3 In pursuit of this goal, 
shareholders may deploy a variety of mechanisms—shareholder 
voting, the threat of a change-of-control transaction, or performance-
based compensation—to encourage managers to succeed and punish 
managers who are poor stewards and fail to enhance shareholder 
value.4 Over time, the relative value of these different devices for 
disciplining managers has ebbed and flowed with the changes in share 
ownership patterns and the constant evolution in legal rules, both 
substantive and procedural.5  
As part of this paradigm, legal scholars regularly examine how 
effectively representative litigation, whether class actions or 
derivative suits, controls managerial agency costs.6 Many scholars 
argue that over the past seventy years shareholder representative 
litigation has acted as an important policing mechanism of managerial 
abuses at U.S. public companies.7 Different types of representative 
litigation have had their moment in the sun—derivative suits early on, 
followed by federal securities class actions, and, most recently, merger 
 
coordination costs, which enabled managers to essentially hire capital rather than capital 
to retain managers).  
 3. See Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial 
Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305, 323–24 (1976). The 
article sets forth the classic framework for considering multiple efficient responses to 
agency costs. See id. at 305–06.  
 4. See Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Rise of Independent Directors in the United States, 
1950–2005: Of Shareholder Value and Stock Market Prices, 59 STAN. L. REV. 1465, 1531–32 
(2007). 
 5. See Randall S. Thomas & Robert B. Thompson, A Theory of Representative 
Shareholder Suits and Its Application to Multijurisdictional Litigation, 106 NW. U. L. REV. 
1753, 1758–60 (2012). 
 6. For an example of a positive view of the efficiency of shareholder suits in 
addressing agency costs, see James D. Cox, Compensation, Deterrence, and the Market as 
Boundaries for Derivative Suit Procedures, 52 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 745, 775–76 (1984). 
But see Daniel R. Fischel & Michael Bradley, The Role of Liability Rules and the 
Derivative Suit in Corporate Law: A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis, 71 CORNELL L. 
REV. 261, 277–83 (1986) (concluding that derivative stockholder suits do not have a 
significant effect on shareholder wealth); Roberta Romano, The Shareholder Suit: 
Litigation Without Foundation?, 7 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 55, 84–85 (1991) (concluding that 
shareholder litigation is a weak and ineffective tool of corporate governance). 
 7. James D. Cox & Randall S. Thomas, Mapping the American Shareholder 
Litigation Experience: A Survey of Empirical Studies of the Enforcement of the U.S. 
Securities Law, 6 EUR. COMPANY & FIN. L. REV. 164, 164–65 (2009); Robert B. Thompson 
& Randall S. Thomas, The New Look of Shareholder Litigation: Acquisition-Oriented 
Class Actions, 57 VAND. L. REV. 133, 134–35 (2004); see C.N.V. Krishnan et al., 
Shareholder Litigation in Mergers and Acquisitions, 18 J. CORP. FIN. 1248, 1249 (2012). 
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litigation—which often produce benefits for shareholders but pose 
difficult challenges as well.8 
In particular, the benefits created by these suits are qualified by 
the litigation agency costs that surround them.9 Litigation agency 
costs arise because suits are often brought by a named plaintiff that 
has no substantial ownership interest in the corporation. As a result, 
the initiation and maintenance of these suits could be easily seen as 
lawyer driven.10 And that perception is further underscored in the 
United States where the “American rule,” in contrast to the “English 
rule,” provides no governor on the suit’s initiation and prosecution.11 
In recent years, concerns about the combination of the English rule 
and litigation agency costs have resulted in legislative and judicial 
actions that restrict shareholder litigation in many ways. 
Our thesis is straightforward: we claim that the recent arrival of 
significant governance developments is a natural consequence of both 
the ineffectiveness and inefficiency of shareholder suits to address 
certain genres of managerial agency costs. That is, just as one part of a 
balloon expands when another part contracts, we reason that 
governance responses evolve to fill voids caused by the 
decompression of shareholder monitoring in areas where it was once 
supplied by private suits. In other words, as representative 
shareholder litigation has been constrained by numerous legal 
developments, the corporate governance system has developed new 
mechanisms as alternative means to address managerial agency costs. 
In addition, we take this argument one step further: we claim 
that these new governance responses are themselves becoming 
stronger due in part to the rising concentration of share ownership of 
public companies. Decades after Berle and Means aroused attention 
to the presence and ills of the separation of ownership from 
 
 8. See generally Jessica Erickson, The New Professional Plaintiffs in Shareholder 
Litigation, 65 FLA. L. REV. 1089 (2013) (examining professional plaintiffs in shareholder 
litigation and providing a proposed framework to address the problem professional 
plaintiffs bring to shareholder litigation). 
 9. There is robust literature on exploring how and why the representative suit 
counsel’s incentives are poorly aligned with the interests of the corporation or its 
shareholders. See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., The Unfaithful Champion: The Plaintiff as 
Monitor in Shareholder Litigation, L. & CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer 1985, at 5, 23. 
 10. See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., Understanding the Plaintiff’s Attorney: The 
Implications of Economic Theory for Private Enforcement of Law Through Class and 
Derivative Actions, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 669, 679–81 (1986); Ralph K. Winter, Paying 
Lawyers, Empowering Prosecutors, and Protecting Managers: Raising the Cost of Capital in 
America, 42 DUKE L.J. 945, 948–49 (1993). 
 11. For a more complete exploration of these differences in a multi-country setting, 
see generally Symposium, Shareholder Suits, 6 EUR. COMPANY & FIN. L. REV. 161 (2009). 
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management, share ownership has steadily evolved so that there are 
now a significant number of large blockholders at most public 
companies.12 This growing concentration of ownership in public 
companies has the twin effects of reducing the costs of collective 
action and increasing the likelihood that an owner exists who will 
have a sufficient economic interest to embrace improved governance 
as a wealth-increasing strategy. Also, the increasing concentration of 
ownership of public companies has the consequential effect of making 
governance responses efficient and effective where the response 
would not have been observed were ownership not concentrated. 
Thus, we not only argue that concentration increases activism among 
this growing group of blockholders but also that concentrated 
ownership ushers in new methods to address agency costs. 
Activist hedge funds are among the most obvious manifestation 
of developments that have changed ownership of U.S. public 
companies and reduced managerial agency costs. They have filled a 
gap left by the closing of the market for corporate control and the 
weakness of acquisition-oriented class actions.13 Hedge funds control 
large pools of unregulated capital and aggressively invest in 
underperforming target companies seeking to bring about stock price 
increases.14 Hedge funds have assumed a role of “governance 
intermediaries” as they develop and present choices for more docile 
institutional holders who can become supporters but are rarely 
initiators.15 Institutional investors are informed by their independent 
third-party proxy advisors on initiatives teed up by the activist hedge 
fund. Hence, in combination, the hedge funds and institutions have 
pushed and shoved to get reluctant managers to take shareholder 
value-maximizing actions and compensate for the slack left by weak 
representative litigation. Using their voting strength, activist hedge 
funds have gained board representation where they act as monitors of 
 
 12. Clifford G. Holderness, The Myth of Diffuse Ownership in the United States, 22 
REV. FIN. STUD. 1377, 1379 (2009). This activism is further facilitated by private equity 
firms’ ownership consolidation. See infra Section III.C. 
 13. See Paul Rose & Bernard S. Sharfman, Shareholder Activism as a Corrective 
Mechanism in Corporate Governance, 2014 B.Y.U. L. REV. 1015, 1018–19 (2014). 
 14. See id. at 1019, 1034. 
 15. See Paul H. Edelman, Randall S. Thomas & Robert B. Thompson, Shareholder 
Voting in an Age of Intermediary Capitalism, 87 S. CAL. L. REV. 1359, 1361 (2014); Ronald 
J. Gilson & Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Agency Costs of Agency Capitalism: Activist Investors 
and the Revaluation of Governance Rights, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 863, 867 (2013) 
(demonstrating how activist hedge funds are desirable complements to the tendency of 
financial institutions to be “rationally reticent”). For a close review of the multiple effects 
of hedge fund activism, see Alon Brav et al., Hedge Fund Activism, Corporate 
Governance, and Firm Performance, 63 J. FIN. 1729, 1755–73 (2008). 
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management; reduce executive compensation; force sales, spinoffs, or 
financial restructurings; or prompt other strategies to improve 
operating performance.16 Alongside these hedge funds, private equity 
firms assist them in their efforts and act as strong managerial 
monitors as well by introducing strong risk management systems, 
among other things.17 
The passage of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and 
Consumer Protection Act further armed investors, both large and 
small, by mandating a non-binding say-on-pay vote (“Say on Pay”).18 
This new vote on executives’ pay fills a corporate governance hole 
created by the failure of derivative suits to regulate compensation; 
Say on Pay resolutions enable shareholders, especially small 
institutional shareholders, to engage in direct monitoring of executive 
compensation.19 While its effectiveness as a check on executive pay is 
still being studied, it has undoubtedly triggered a greater level of 
engagement between corporate directors and shareholders on 
compensation issues. It should not be overlooked that such 
engagements are facilitated by, if not the direct result of, the rising 
concentration of share ownership in the hands of institutional 
investors. 
This Article also considers the rising role of the appraisal remedy 
within the context of developments in shareholder litigation focused 
on acquisitions. The appraisal proceeding, an old and previously 
largely defunct form of litigation, has been resuscitated by a few 
hedge fund investment groups, who have begun filing these actions in 
efforts to engage in what some have called “appraisal arbitrage.”20 As 
 
 16. See Martin Lipton, Dealing with Activist Hedge Funds, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON 
CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (Aug. 9, 2012), http://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2012/08
/09/dealing-with-activist-hedge-funds/ [https://perma.cc/6TX5-6NF7]. 
 17. Ronald W. Masulis & Randall S. Thomas, Does Private Equity Create Wealth? 
The Effects of Private Equity and Derivatives on Corporate Governance, 76 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 219, 220 (2009); see also Martin Lipton, Dealing with Activist Hedge Funds, HARV. L. 
SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (Nov. 6, 2014), http://corpgov.law.harvard
.edu/2014/11/06/dealing-with-activist-hedge-funds-3/ [https://perma.cc/49DG-DSE6].  
 18. Randall S. Thomas & Christoph Van der Elst, Say on Pay Around the World, 92 
WASH. U. L. REV. 653, 659–60 (2015); see Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer 
Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, §	951, 124 Stat. 1376, 1899–1900 (2010) (codified as 
amended at 15 U.S.C. §	78n-1 (2012)). 
 19. See Miriam Schwartz-Ziv & Russ Wermers, Which Shareholders Benefit from 
Low-Cost Monitoring Opportunities? Evidence from Say on Pay 1–2 (Robert H. Smith 
Sch. of Bus., Research Paper No. RHS 2510442, 2015), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers
.cfm?abstract_id=2510442 [https://perma.cc/ZZ3U-4AU3 (staff-uploaded archive)]. 
 20. See Appraisal Arbitrage: Will It Become a New Hedge Fund Strategy?, LATHAM & 
WATKINS LLP (May 2007), https://www.lw.com/upload/pubContent/_pdf/pub1883_1.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/W6GZ-UV4A].  
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discussed later, although shareholders seeking protection through the 
appraisal remedy must overcome many hurdles to employ appraisal 
as a meaningful alternative to merger litigation, as these suits are 
sometimes subject to abuse, appraisal has the potential to become an 
important monitoring mechanism. 
Though multiple evolving governance mechanisms already 
address managerial agency costs, there nonetheless seems to be a new 
litigation approach to address lapses in managerial stewardship as 
well. Failures of managerial oversight with regard to product safety, 
operating risks, and compliance with the law may be addressed using 
securities fraud class actions after the Supreme Court’s most recent 
antifraud decision in Omnicare, Inc. v. Laborers District Council 
Construction Industry Pension Fund.21 As developed below, private 
enforcement actions building on Omnicare have the potential to 
police executives reporting to investors about their management 
oversight efforts. These instances will certainly occur when boards or 
senior officers provide optimistic assessments of their compliance 
systems that are materially incomplete in their reassurances. The 
resulting false representations respecting strength of internal systems 
and false images of board oversight can be disciplined based on the 
holding in Omnicare. Consequently, the possibility of such suits can 
be expected to promote greater attention to stewardship by managers 
who will take their oversight more seriously so as to avoid later 
charges that they falsely represented their oversight. 
We conclude that each one of these new or revived monitoring 
techniques may be able to stand in for acquisition-oriented and 
derivative shareholder litigation to ensure that managerial agency 
costs are kept low. This Article proceeds as follows. Part I focuses on 
the breakdown of acquisition-oriented class actions and their 
potential replacement as a shareholder-monitoring device by activist 
hedge funds and appraisal arbitrage. Next, Part II exposes the 
weakness of derivative suit litigation as a check on excessive 
executive compensation arrangements and the potential for Say on 
Pay votes and hedge fund activism to supplant it as a shareholder-
monitoring device. Finally, Part III discusses how derivative litigation 
has done little to ensure that managers and boards engage in 
appropriate levels of oversight activities. We then argue that after 
Omnicare, this function may be taken over by the federal securities 
laws and, to a smaller extent, private equity firms acting as monitors 
 
 21. 135 S. Ct. 1318 (2015). 
95 N.C. L. REV. 19 (2016) 
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of internal control systems. We conclude with a summary and some 
policy suggestions. 
I.  ACQUISITION-ORIENTED CLASS ACTIONS AND NEW 
GOVERNANCE INITIATIVES 
During the past seventy years, there have been many shifts 
among the multiple types of shareholder litigation. Despite these ebbs 
and flows, the business community shares the common view that 
shareholder litigation is vexatious, robust, and expanding.22 This 
perspective is partly justified, at least with respect to litigation 
spawned by acquisitions in light of the recent dramatic frequency of 
such deal-related litigation. This Part sets forth the significant 
substantive and procedural changes that have adversely affected 
shareholder acquisition-oriented class actions in the United States. 
We then argue that these developments have prompted other 
governance techniques to move into areas where shareholder 
litigation formerly was the primary mechanism for limiting 
managerial agency costs. 
A. Shareholder M&A Class Actions 
Delaware jurisprudence has for some time placed a bright 
bullseye on M&A transactions, inviting shareholder-initiated court 
challenges. The initial development in this area facilitated 
shareholder suits aimed at self-dealing acquisitions, such as where a 
cash-out merger occurs with the controlling stockholder.23 Close 
judicial review was later extended to multi-step acquisitions with a 
dominant stockholder.24 In such transactions, the Delaware courts 
often placed the burden of proving entire fairness of the transaction 
on the dominant stockholder.25 Moreover, heightened scrutiny is 
extended in situations of any sale of control to a third party, placing 
the burden on management to prove it acted reasonably to get the 
 
 22. See Trevor S. Norwitz, Delaware Poised to Embrace Appraisal Arbitrage, CLS 
BLUE SKY BLOG (Mar. 9, 2015), http://clsbluesky.law.columbia.edu/2015/03/09/delaware-
poised-to-embrace-appraisal-arbitrage/ [https://perma.cc/34ZC-N2HF]. 
 23. See Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 703 (Del. 1983). 
 24. See In re Pure Res., Inc., S’holders Litig., 808 A.2d 421, 424–25 (Del. Ch. 2002) 
(holding that a controlling stockholder who raises ownership interest to a level sufficient 
to carry out a short-form merger via a tender offer must establish (1) entire fairness in the 
resulting merger, unless such merger is consummated on the same terms as the preceding 
tender offer; (2) the overall transaction is conditioned on a non-waivable plebiscite of a 
majority of the independent shareholders; and (3) there are no accompanying retributive 
threats). 
 25. See Weinberger, 457 A.2d at 703. 
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best offer.26 And should the target of another firm’s ardor take steps 
to rebuff the bidder’s overture, Delaware subjects those defensive 
actions to heightened scrutiny.27 Knitting each of these doctrines 
together is the Delaware courts’ belief that the significance of the 
transaction to the shareholders and, in some instances, the prospect of 
director self-interest present an appealing case to lift the otherwise 
strong presumption of independence and director good faith so that a 
fulsome inquiry of the overall fairness of a transaction can be 
judicially conducted. 
By targeting such transactions for closer scrutiny, judicial 
doctrine has had the natural effect of attracting litigation. Indeed, 
litigation against publicly-held companies that undertake deals is now 
of epidemic proportions and overwhelmingly arises in the form of 
class actions, as opposed to derivative suits.28 Generally, multiple suits 
are filed very quickly after the announcement of a transaction; 
counsel in such suits are usually law firms with a rich history of 
engaging in such litigation.29 Data regarding such suits in an earlier 
time show that those suits challenged primarily deals in which 
managers had a conflict of interest, the suits tended to produce cash 
settlements, and the cases did not exhibit the same degree of litigation 
agency costs that were commonly believed to accompany other 
representative suits.30 Thus, from 1999–2000 only 10.31% of deals 
were litigated; most of such litigation focused on Delaware 
companies, and the suits were maintained in Delaware.31 
Furthermore, this litigation decreased the likelihood of a deal closing 
but also increased the returns on the deals that did close. Overall, this 
litigation was associated with an increased return for target firm 
shareholders.32 
Much of this has since changed dramatically so that today almost 
all deals attract suits.33 Matthew Cain and Steven Davidoff report that 
in 2012 there were 121 transactions over $100 million in value and 
 
 26. See Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 185 (Del. 
1986) (first case to extend heightened scrutiny); see also Paramount Commc’ns Inc. v. 
QVC Network Inc., 637 A.2d 34, 36 (Del. 1994) (clarifying the extension of heightened 
scrutiny). 
 27. See Unitrin, Inc. v. Am. Gen. Corp., 651 A.2d 1361, 1387–88 (Del. 1995), 
modifying Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985). 
 28. Thompson & Thomas, supra note 7, at 137. 
 29. Id. at 138. 
 30. See id. at 172 tbl.4. 
 31. Krishnan et al., supra note 7, at 1253, 1254 tbl.1. 
 32. Id. at 1250. 
 33. See Thomas & Thompson, supra note 5, at 1781. 
95 N.C. L. REV. 19 (2016) 
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that 111 of these deals experienced deal litigation.34 Roughly 50% of 
these 111 deals also resulted in litigation in more than one 
jurisdiction.35 While several commentators have opined on the 
underlying causes for these developments,36 we observe that these 
developments have occurred while the number of securities class 
actions and their lawyers have declined.37 While causation is always 
difficult to prove, we surmise that the rapid rise in transaction-
oriented litigation could, at least in part, reflect many plaintiff-
oriented law firms redirecting their foci away from the once-booming 
securities fraud litigation that has now contracted.38 
Just as too much fudge can be a problem, too warm an invitation 
to challenge transactions and an ensuing response to challenge 
common transactions creates its list of problems. One of the more 
apparent problems derives from a host of concerns that flow from 
multi-forum litigation focused on a single transaction. At a minimum, 
several suits challenging the same deal in various forums may levy 
non-trivial costs on the involved corporations. Even when all suits are 
within the same state, litigation costs might be magnified, as there 
invariably will be the question of what impact the resolution of the 
dispute in one forum will have on another forum. To be sure, when 
suits are within a single jurisdiction, courts can, as is the case in 
Delaware, invoke the simplifying heuristics of the first-to-file rule to 
address the competing claims of different parties.39 However, when 
litigation straddles two or more jurisdictions, such an easy-to-
administer approach is not available. When a suit spans two or more 
 
 34. See Matthew D. Cain & Steven M. Davidoff, Takeover Litigation in 2013, at 1–2 
(Ohio State Univ. Moritz Coll. of Law, Pub. Law Legal Theory Working Paper Series & 
Ctr. for Interdisciplinary Law & Policy Studies, Working Paper No. 236, 2014), http://
papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2377001 [https://perma.cc/MZS2-W3UQ (staff-
uploaded archive)]. 
 35. See id. at 2 tbl.A. 
 36. See John Armour, Bernard Black & Brian Cheffins, Is Delaware Losing its Cases?, 
9 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 605, 634 (2012); Sean J. Griffith & Alexandra D. Lahav, 
The Market for Preclusion in Merger Litigation, 66 VAND. L. REV. 1053, 1069–70 (2013); 
Thomas & Thompson, supra note 5, at 1794–99. 
 37. For an extensive discussion of the differences between securities fraud class 
actions and M&A deal class actions, see Thomas & Thompson, supra note 5, at 1773–84.  
 38. See id. at 1776–78. 
 39. In a thoughtful analysis of the problems posed by such multi-forum litigation, 
Professor George Geis argues that the preferred solution is forum selection bylaws, 
discussed later in this Section. See George S. Geis, Shareholder Derivative Litigation and 
the Preclusion Problem, 100 VA. L. REV. 261, 298–99 (2014). Where the firm does not 
have such a provision, he suggests the outcome be guided by the court’s assessment of the 
adequacy of counsel. Id. at 306. Professor Geis also recommends more vigorous 
application of statutory authority to assign costs for ill-conceived suits. Id. at 309. 
95 N.C. L. REV. 19 (2016) 
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sovereigns, comity among competing courts is possible, but such 
coordination involves costly and time-consuming one-off discussions 
among the involved courts, for which the outcome is less than 
certain.40 Moreover, uncertainty regarding which suit will be deemed 
 
 40. A sobering lesson to be drawn from the explosion of multi-forum litigation is 
illustrated by the Delaware Supreme Court in Pyott v. Louisiana Municipal Police 
Employees’ Retirement System, 74 A.3d 612 (Del. 2013), where derivative suits were filed 
in the District Court for the Central District of California and Delaware Chancery Court 
following Allergan’s guilty plea and payment of a $600 million fine for having actively 
marketed off-label uses of its blockbuster drug, Botox. Id. at 615. Despite the fact that the 
case was proceeding on an expedited discovery calendar in Delaware, the California 
federal court acted first. In In re Allergan, Inc., Shareholder Derivative Litigation, No. 
SACV 10-01352 DOC (MLGx), 2011 WL 1429626 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 12, 2011), the federal 
district court dismissed the derivative suit on the grounds that the plaintiffs failed to allege 
sufficient facts to excuse a demand on the board of directors under governing Delaware 
precedents. Id. at *5. Thereupon, the defendants moved to dismiss the Delaware suit, 
arguing that through the application of collateral estoppel, the Delaware suit could not 
continue because the full faith and credit clause of the Constitution required a dismissal. 
La. Mun. Police Emps.’ Ret. Sys. v. Pyott, 46 A.3d 313, 316, 324 n.2 (Del. Ch. 2012). In an 
extensive review of the governing law and the factual allegations set forth in the 
complaint, Vice Chancellor Laster refused to dismiss the case. Id. at 316. 
  Vice Chancellor Laster reasoned that preclusion on the basis of collateral estoppel 
required privity between the litigants. Id. at 324. While privity exists in contemporaneous 
derivative suits, even though different plaintiffs initiated the suits, Vice Chancellor Laster 
held that under Delaware precedent, because of the plaintiffs’ failure to show that demand 
was excused whereby the plaintiffs could be deemed the legal representatives for the 
corporation’s suit, privity does not exist when the suit has been dismissed because demand 
was neither made nor excused. Id. at 334–35. An independent basis for holding that the 
Delaware suit was not collaterally estopped was his belief that the plaintiffs in the 
California suit were not adequate representatives. Id. at 335. The basis for this conclusion 
was that the California suit’s plaintiffs were represented by what Vice Chancellor Laster 
described as a fast-filing “specialized plaintiff’s firm” that customarily files suits on a 
contingency fee basis. Id. at 336. The opinion did not mention that the action before him 
was being prosecuted by a firm that also fit this profile. Much of the opinion on this issue 
is directed to reviewing the problems that flow from the first-to-file rule, most significantly 
prompting hasty filings of ill-conceived suits, concluding that “[b]y leaping to litigate 
without first conducting a meaningful investigation, the California plaintiffs’ firms failed to 
fulfill the fiduciary duties they voluntarily assumed as derivative action plaintiffs.” Id. at 
350. The court thus concluded that preclusion was not in order since the earlier action 
failed to provide adequate representation for Allergan. Id. 
  The Delaware Supreme Court reversed on both points. See Pyott, 74 A.3d at 614. 
The court held that California, and not Delaware, law should determine whether privity is 
lacking due to the derivative suit’s dismissal for the failure to excuse demand on the board 
of directors. Id. at 616. It concluded that under California law, contrary to the approach in 
Delaware, privity is satisfied even though the suit is dismissed for failure to excuse a 
demand. Id. at 616–17. The court also held that the irrebuttable presumption that fast-
filers are inadequate representatives was not justified, which led to the court’s conclusion 
that the prior suit did not preclude the Delaware suit. Id. at 618.  
  A close review of the two opinions supports the view that the complaint before 
the Delaware court was far more detailed in supporting the central allegations of an 
oversight claim, like the one in In re Caremark International Inc. Derivative Litigation, 698 
A.2d 959 (Del. Ch. 1996), than was set forth in the complaint before the federal district 
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the lead one undercuts plaintiffs’ counsels’ incentive to be heavily 
invested in it. This is due in part to the concern that their efforts in 
developing the case will prove unrewarded if their suit does not 
become the lead suit.41 
Further eroding counsels’ incentive to invest heavily in an 
atmosphere of multi-forum litigation is the lurking fear of the reverse 
auction. With the reverse auction, unscrupulous plaintiffs’ (and 
defendants’) counsel advance their own financial interests by entering 
into a global settlement that greatly undervalues the injury suffered 
by the class shareholders.42 The reverse auction not only weakens the 
compensatory function of shareholder suits but also, by providing 
relief cheapened by the attorney’s self-interest, weakens the 
deterrence value of the suit. 
 
court. As such, there was a substantial basis to support Vice Chancellor Laster’s 
conclusion that sufficient facts were alleged to support reasonable inferences that the 
directors and officers of Allergan expected to garner increased sales by active promotion 
of off-label uses of Botox. Pyott, 46 A.3d at 357. Of note is that the difference is not with 
the judge but the quality of the derivative suit counsel. See C.N.V. Krishnan, Steven 
Davidoff Solomon & Randall S. Thomas, Who Are the Top Law Firms? Assessing the 
Value of Plaintiffs’ Law Firms in Merger Litigation, 18 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 122, 148–49 
(2016). 
  The difference between the two courts is not a dispute over doctrine. It is a 
dispute over whether facts violate a doctrine, namely the fiduciary obligation of officers 
and directors not to knowingly violate a criminal statute. And there is no reason to believe 
that if the federal district judge had the Delaware complaint before him, his decision 
would have been different from that reached by Vice Chancellor Laster. Ultimately, any 
difference in zealousness between plaintiffs’ counsel in the California federal court and the 
Delaware court was addressed by the Ninth Circuit reversing the district court’s dismissal, 
chastising the trial court for repeatedly drawing inferences in the board’s favor. See 
Rosenbloom v. Pyott, 765 F.3d 1137, 1159 (9th Cir. 2014). 
 41. Thomas & Thompson, supra note 5, at 1769. 
 42. See id. at 1770. By way of illustration, consider Matsushita Electric Industrial Co. v. 
Epstein, 516 U.S. 367 (1996), where Matsushita was sued in two class actions: one in 
federal court alleging violations of the federal securities laws regulating tender offers and 
the other in the Delaware Chancery Court alleging various breaches of fiduciary duty by 
company officers. Id. at 370. Matsushita prevailed in federal district court, and while that 
decision was being appealed to the Ninth Circuit, Matsushita entered into a global 
settlement approved by the Delaware court on terms that released the claims that were 
raised only in federal court. Id. at 370–71. Even though the state court lacked jurisdiction 
to entertain the federal securities law claims, the U.S. Supreme Court held that the full 
faith and credit clause of the U.S. Constitution required upholding the global settlement, 
provided the shareholders’ interests were adequately represented. Id. at 386–87. In Epstein 
v. MCA, Inc., 179 F.3d 641 (9th Cir. 1999), the court held that the Delaware litigants and 
their attorney adequately represented the shareholders in prosecuting that suit. Id. at 650. 
In the background of this matter is the important fact that the two suits were being 
prosecuted by two competing law firms and that the damages being pursued in the federal 
district court were of a significantly greater amount than those at play in the Delaware 
state action. Hence, precedent exists under which a reverse auction can occur, if not thrive. 
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In addition to the frequency of deal-focused litigation, further 
disquiet arises from recent evidence that non-cash settlements—
whether in the form of changes in merger agreement terms or 
additional disclosure—do not have a significant impact on 
shareholder approval rates for completed deals.43 The fear is that 
regardless of whether the suits assert meritorious claims, the 
settlements reached will not produce observable benefits. The 
consequence of this being true is that judicial doctrines intended to 
protect shareholders are instead yielding a dead weight loss in the 
form of costly litigation. 
Delaware has innovated in the face of the explosion of deal-
focused litigation and growing awareness of the negative social 
consequences that may be facilitated by multi-forum suits, and suits 
generally, just as it did initially by creating the doctrine inviting these 
cases. Among the state’s substantive innovations was excepting from 
close burden-shifted fairness inquiry freezeouts pursuant to state 
short-form merger statutes that allow parents to acquire a ninety 
percent owned subsidiary solely upon the approval of the parent 
board of directors.44 More recently in Kahn v. M&F Worldwide 
Corp.,45 the Delaware Supreme Court held that an acquisition 
involving the dominant stockholder would nonetheless enjoy a 
presumption of fairness if there is both impartial approval by a 
majority of the disinterested shareholders of the subsidiary and the 
subsidiary was vigorously represented in the negotiations by a truly 
independent negotiating committee.46 Where both of these conditions 
are met, the transaction enjoys the substantial protections of the 
business judgment rule, which is generally accorded to arm’s-length 
transactions.47 The Delaware legislature has also entered this area by 
authorizing a “streamlined back-end merger” whereby two 
independent firms can merge upon (1) their boards approving the 
 
 43. See Jill E. Fisch, Sean J. Griffith & Steven Davidoff Solomon, Confronting the 
Peppercorn Settlement in Merger Litigation: An Empirical Analysis and a Proposal for 
Reform, 93 TEX. L. REV. 557, 580–81, 585 (2015) (finding that of 453 firms in the 2005–
2012 time period, 319 experienced litigation, of which 191 resulted in settlements that 
either amended merger terms or provided only additional disclosure, which did not impact 
the ultimate shareholder vote and was weak evidence that an increase in consideration 
impacts shareholder vote). 
 44. See Glassman v. Unocal Expl. Corp., 777 A.2d 242, 247 (Del. 2001). 
 45. 88 A.3d 635 (Del. 2014). 
 46. Id. at 645–46. 
 47. Id. at 646. 
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merger and (2) the acquirer, through a tender offer, obtaining enough 
shares of the other company to assure approval of the merger.48 
Further innovations have been made to confront the explosion of 
multi-forum suits. Using mechanisms provided within corporate 
statutes, corporate lawyers have developed a powerful antidote to 
multi-forum suits through the now widely-adopted forum selection 
clause. The standard forum selection clause is set forth in the 
corporate bylaws and authorizes the board of directors to designate a 
favored forum which is customarily, but not always, the corporation’s 
state of incorporation. Forum selection bylaws were embraced by 
now-Chief Justice of Delaware Leo Strine Jr. in Boilermakers Local 
154 Retirement Fund v. Chevron Corp.,49 where the court upheld a 
unilaterally director-adopted forum selection bylaw, reasoning that 
the bylaws, including the board’s authority to adopt bylaws, were an 
extension of the shareholders’ contractual rights to the corporation.50 
In 2015, the Delaware legislature passed a statute formally 
authorizing the inclusion of forum selection provisions in corporate 
bylaws.51 
Thus, it is likely that there will be dramatic contractions in the 
use of acquisition-oriented litigation in Delaware because of these 
changes. While the Delaware courts initially developed broad 
substantive doctrines that provided avenues for shareholders to 
challenge the conduct of boards of directors in mergers and 
acquisitions, they subsequently significantly narrowed the avenues for 
doing so. This change, combined with Delaware’s approval of boards 
adopting bylaws that channel those challenges to Delaware, will 
restrict the scope of acquisition-oriented class actions. Moreover, 
other state courts and legislatures are beginning to weigh in with 
 
 48. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §	251(h) (2015). A similar provision was adopted in 
Maryland in 2014. See MD. CODE ANN., CORPS. & ASS’NS §	3-106.1 (West 2015). 
 49. 73 A.3d 934 (Del. Ch. 2013). 
 50. Id. at 954, 958. 
 51. Act of June 24, 2015, ch. 40, §	5, 80 Del. Laws __, __ (codified at DEL. CODE ANN. 
tit. 8, §	115). Governor Jack Markell signed the bill on June 24, 2015. Michael Greene, 
Delaware Fee-Shifting Bill Signed into Law; Also Endorses Exclusive Forum Clauses, 
BLOOMBERG BNA (June 26, 2015), http://www.bna.com/delaware-feeshifting-bill-
n17179928834/ [https://perma.cc/5UGS-BVM5]. The same legislation also added 
sections	102 and 109, prohibiting fee-shifting provisions in articles of incorporation or 
bylaws, respectively. See §	1, 3 (codified at DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§	102, 109). Earlier, 
following a contract-focused approach whereby the articles of incorporation and bylaws 
are understood to define the shareholders’ relation with their corporation, the Delaware 
Supreme Court held that, in the articles, the grant of authority to the board of directors to 
amend the articles thus enables the board of directors to adopt a bylaw that would shift 
the corporation’s litigation costs to the shareholder suit’s plaintiff if unsuccessful. ATP 
Tour, Inc. v. Deutscher Tennis Bund, 91 A.3d 554, 557–58 (Del. 2014). 
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bylaw changes that would require fee shifting onto plaintiffs in these 
class actions.52 The 800-pound gorilla in the room that has yet to be 
addressed is whether any states will permit corporate bylaws that 
mandate sending shareholder-manager disputes to arbitration.53 What 
does seem clear though is that the combination of these new bylaws 
will most likely lead to less manager and director accountability to 
shareholders. 
B. Appraisal Arbitrage: A Remedy for Controlling Shareholder Self-
Dealing? 
In the past, merger litigation played a significant monitoring role 
in addressing possible agency costs in corporate transactions, 
especially by controlling shareholder squeezeouts of minority 
shareholders in cash-out mergers. It was particularly valuable for 
small shareholders who would otherwise be unable to bring cases to 
challenge managerial misconduct in an acquisition. Empirical 
research examining deal-focused litigation’s role at the turn of the 
millennium found that class action lawsuits challenging the fairness of 
the consideration paid in M&A transactions had a positive impact on 
takeover premiums.54 However, as discussed above,55 the future of 
merger litigation has been placed in jeopardy by the explosion of its 
use, the adoption of forum selection bylaws, and, at least in some 
jurisdictions, the availability of fee-shifting bylaws. If this is true, is 
there another form of shareholder monitoring that could take its 
place? 
One possible candidate is appraisal litigation. In an appraisal 
proceeding, shareholders can ask a court to determine the fair market 
value of their shares if they dissent from, or do not vote in favor of, a 
pending corporate transaction.56 State laws vary widely with respect to 
 
 52. See, e.g., OKLA. STAT. tit. 18, §	1126 (2015) (“In any derivative action instituted by 
a shareholder of a domestic or foreign corporation, the court having jurisdiction, upon 
final judgment, shall require the nonprevailing party or parties to pay the prevailing party 
or parties the reasonable expenses, including attorney fees, taxable as costs, incurred as a 
result of such action.”). 
 53. See generally James D. Cox, Corporate Law and the Limits of Private Ordering, 93 
WASH. U. L. REV. 257 (2015) (arguing that boards of directors should not have the 
authority to amend bylaws that affect the procedural and substantive relationship between 
shareholders and the corporation); Ann M. Lipton, Manufactured Consent: The Problem 
of Arbitration Clauses in Corporate Charters and Bylaws, 104 GEO. L.J. 583 (2016) 
(arguing that recent Delaware cases are blurring the lines between contract law and those 
laws that govern corporate formation and modification). 
 54. Krishnan et al., supra note 7, at 1262.  
 55. See supra Section I.A. 
 56. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §	262(a) (2015). 
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the availability of appraisal.57 States that are more solicitous of 
shareholders provide appraisal for amendments to the articles of 
incorporation that adversely affect the rights of stockholders, the sale 
of all or substantially all the firm’s assets, and mergers and 
consolidations;58 in contrast, Delaware limits its appraisal statute to 
mergers and consolidations.59 Meanwhile, the Model Business 
Corporation Act follows a course between these two positions.60 
Traditionally, appraisal has been viewed as an ineffective remedy 
for shareholders due to its cumbersome procedures and very limited 
scope. Commentators have identified three significant disadvantages 
with the appraisal remedy61: (1) the difficult procedural steps that 
must be followed in precise order to preserve one’s right to the 
remedy;62 (2) the lack of a class action procedure that would permit 
easy joinder of all dissenting shareholders so that the costs of bringing 
an action could be more widely shared;63 and (3) the narrow limits of 
the remedy.64 Small shareholders were stymied by these problems, 
while larger blockholders made sparing use of the appraisal remedy.65 
As a result, historically few appraisal actions were filed and even 
 
 57. JAMES D. COX & THOMAS LEE HAZEN, CORPORATIONS §	22.19, at 619 (2d ed. 
2003).  
 58. See, e.g., CAL. CORP. CODE §§	181, 1200–1203, 1300(a) (West 2015); N.Y. BUS. 
CORP. LAW §	910 (McKinney 2015). 
 59. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §	262(b). 
 60. See MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT §	13.02(a) (2015). 
 61. See Charles R. Korsmo & Minor Myers, Appraisal Arbitrage and the Future of 
Public Company M&A, 92 WASH. U. L. REV. 1551, 1560–61 (2015). 
 62. For example, under the Model Business Corporation Act, if a shareholder vote is 
required for the fundamental change, the shareholders must give written notice of their 
intent to dissent prior to the vote and then must refrain from voting in favor of the plan. 
MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT §	13.21. Under the Delaware Act, after the vote, the corporation 
must give notice of the right to dissent within ten days, and thereafter, the shareholders 
have twenty days to make a written demand. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §	262(d)(2). 
 63. See Randall S. Thomas, Revising the Delaware Appraisal Statute, 3 DEL. L. REV. 1, 
27–29 (2000) (describing the costs of appraisal proceedings). 
 64. The market out provision eliminates appraisal rights for mergers and 
consolidations where there is a liquid market for their securities. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8 
§	262(b)(1). The right to appraisal is restored if the target company’s shareholders are 
required to take consideration different from the shares they formerly held, such as cash. 
Thomas, supra note 63, at 11–12. 
 65. See generally Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 884 A.2d 26 (Del. 2005) (showing 
the costs of pursuing appraisal, even to large shareholders). In Cede & Co., after the 
minority shareholders of Technicolor, Inc. were cashed out, a beneficial owner sought 
appraisal. Id. at 31. Unsatisfied with the result, the beneficial owners appealed. Id. at 32. 
The result was an extensive sequence of litigation spanning almost twenty years, leading to 
numerous disputes over the amount of the discount rate, whether post-judgment interest 
was owed, and how much discretion was owed to the chancery court’s initial analysis. See 
id. at 32–34. 
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fewer were actively litigated.66 As developed below, the rise of hedge 
funds and their resourcefulness in maximizing gain have resurrected 
the appraisal remedy, at least in the hands of a large, sophisticated 
investor. 
Professors Marcel Kahan and Edward Rock were the first 
scholars to note that hedge fund managers who were dissatisfied with 
the terms of an acquisition were adapting appraisal litigation for a 
new purpose.67 They point out that activist hedge funds engage in 
appraisal arbitrage when they buy shares of a target company’s stock 
with the objective of filing an appraisal petition, ultimately seeking a 
higher price for their stock.68 Thus, appraisal arbitrage is a good 
example of how the increasing concentration of stock ownership may 
be leading to changes in shareholder-monitoring devices.69 
Several authors have picked up this idea and written substantial 
articles debating the appropriate role of appraisal litigation as a 
monitor of M&A deals.70 Professor George Geis focused on a 
Delaware Chancery Court appraisal decision, In re Appraisal of 
Transkaryotic Therapies, Inc.71 This case resolved a technical question 
about which shareholders qualified to seek appraisal after the 
announcement of a merger.72 In particular, the court held that 
shareholders that purchased their stock in the target company after 
the record date for the stockholders’ meeting but before the date of 
the stockholder vote and who therefore did not have the right to vote 
the shares at the meeting could nonetheless seek appraisal.73 The net 
effect of the decision was the facilitation of hedge funds accumulating 
 
 66. See Thomas, supra note 63, at 22–23 (finding an average of less than fourteen 
appraisal actions filed per year from 1977 to 1997). 
 67. See Marcel Kahan & Edward B. Rock, Hedge Funds in Corporate Governance and 
Corporate Control, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 1021, 1038–1039 (2007). 
 68. See id. 
 69. See Appraisal Arbitrage: Will It Become a New Hedge Fund Strategy?, supra note 
20. 
 70. See George S. Geis, An Appraisal Puzzle, 105 NW. U. L. REV. 1635, 1640–41 
(2011); Wei Jiang et al., Appraisal: Shareholder Remedy or Litigation Arbitrage?, 59 J.L. & 
ECON. (forthcoming 2016) (manuscript at 2–4), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm
?abstract_id=2766776 [https://perma.cc/H75W-F2R8 (staff-uploaded archive)]; Korsmo & 
Myers, supra note 61, at 1555–57; see also Charles R. Korsmo & Minor Myers, The 
Structure of Stockholder Litigation: When Do the Merits Matter?, 75 OHIO ST. L.J. 829, 
835–36 (2014). 
 71. No. Civ.A. 1554-CC, 2007 WL 1378345 (Del. Ch. May 2, 2007). 
 72. Id. at *1. 
 73. See id. at *3–4. 
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substantial stakes in target companies in order to file appraisal actions 
in the hopes of making large profits on their investments.74 
Based on some hedge fund litigation over the scope of their 
appraisal rights, Geis argues that “it is possible that a robust market 
for appraisal rights will develop, analogous to the market for 
corporate control that allegedly disciplines otherwise entrenched 
managers with the threat of an external takeover.”75 If so, Geis 
concludes that “corporate law might play a meaningful role in 
enhancing firm value by policing freezeout mergers in a more 
nuanced and creative manner.”76 Yet, Geis equivocates about 
whether this is beneficial to target company shareholders because of 
concerns that opening up the appraisal remedy will lead to more 
strike suits and therefore suggests further restrictions on 
shareholders’ (already quite limited) ability to bring these cases.77 
Professors Charles Korsmo and Minor Myers provide very useful 
empirical data on this phenomenon. Using a data set of appraisal 
cases from 2004 to 2013, they found that the dollar value of dissenting 
shares in appraisal actions spiked sharply in 2013.78 They documented 
the rise of a small, but growing, group of hedge funds filing multiple 
appraisal actions arising out of different transactions.79 These repeat 
petitioners “target deals where the merger premium is low and where 
controlling stockholders are taking the company private.”80 
Considering these findings, Korsmo and Myers argue that a robust 
appraisal remedy could be working in a socially responsible way as a 
“back-end check on abuses by corporate managers, controlling 
shareholders, or other insiders in merger transactions.”81 
Professor Wei Jiang and her coauthors conducted a large-scale 
empirical analysis of the characteristics, determinants, and returns to 
appraisal petitions during 2000–2014.82 Using a hand-collected sample 
including every appraisal case filed during that time period, they 
found that appraisal petitions are more likely to be filed in going-
private transactions, control shareholder squeezeouts, and 
transactions that pay target shareholders low premiums over the 
 
 74. See Geis, supra note 70, at 1654–56; Appraisal Arbitrage: Will It Become a New 
Hedge Fund Strategy?, supra note 20. 
 75. Geis, supra note 70, at 1638. 
 76. Id. at 1658. 
 77. Id. at 1676. 
 78. See Korsmo & Myers, supra note 61, at 1571 fig.3. 
 79. Id. at 1572. 
 80. Id. at 1583. 
 81. Id. at 1598. 
 82. Jiang et al., supra note 70, at 3. 
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market price of their shares.83 These findings support Korsmo and 
Myers’s claim that appraisal acts as a shareholder remedy against 
abusive deals. However, Jiang and her colleagues found further 
evidence suggesting that appraisal actions may sometimes be strike 
suits—as of 2014, appraisal actions were filed in over one quarter of 
all deals in which appraisal is available; eighty percent of these suits 
were settled before trial, and many of these settlements were in 
actions filed by very small investors.84 
We are cautious about the effects of this potential trend. First, 
any monitoring effects on M&A activity that will arise out of 
appraisal litigation will be limited to the small set of deals where 
appraisal is available. For example, even at the peak of this trend, 
Korsmo and Myers found that only slightly more than 15% of 
statutorily covered transactions had appraisal actions filed challenging 
the consideration paid in the deal,85 although Jiang and her coauthors 
found it to be around 25%.86 In addition, this percentage can be 
expected to fall if deal planners restructure the transaction so as to 
minimize or even avoid appraisal; one such strategy to remove any 
opportunity for appraisal is to distribute stock as consideration for the 
merger.87 
The biggest class of public company transactions where appraisal 
is currently available consists of cash-out mergers. Of these, third-
party sales in arm’s-length transactions in a well-shopped deal are 
likely to be fairly priced. In this class of deals, the Delaware courts 
have “suggested that a market test of a transaction will serve as a 
proxy for fair value in appraisal suits, so that arm’s-length deals with 
adequate market checks do not create appraisal risks for buyers.”88 If 
this is correct, shareholders would not be expected to file such cases, 
as they are expensive to litigate and unlikely to result in judicial 
determinations that the plaintiffs are entitled to a price greater than 
the merger price. However, if such cases are being filed and settled 
 
 83. See id. at 4, 23–24. 
 84. Id. at 4, 19–20, 29. 
 85. See Korsmo & Myers, supra note 61, at 1569 fig.2. 
 86. See Jiang et al., supra note 70, at 42 fig.1. 
 87. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8 §	262(b)(2) (2015). To the extent this creates a 
problem, the market out exception must be eliminated. As numerous critics have pointed 
out, shareholders who receive marketable securities for their shares in a merger may still 
need appraisal: if they sell those shares in the market after the merger, then they will 
suffer an uncompensated loss. See, e.g., Korsmo & Myers, supra note 61, at 1606–07. 
 88. COUNCIL OF THE CORP. LAW SECTION, DEL. STATE BAR ASS’N, SECTION 262 
APPRAISAL AMENDMENTS 2 (2015), https://www.lowenstein.com/files/upload/DGCL
%20262%20Proposal%203-6-15%20Explanatory%20Paper.pdf [https://perma.cc/2ERX-
MXPB]. 
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for valuable consideration, that would suggest they are frivolous cases 
that have only nuisance value. 
Among the remaining set of potential deals subject to the 
appraisal remedy, appraisal would be expected to be most useful in 
control shareholder squeezeouts—the transactions with the greatest 
potential for below market premiums being paid in sale-of-control 
transactions. In control shareholder squeezeouts, the transaction 
cannot be subject to a market check, and “fiduciary duties and 
litigation may not be sufficient to ensure that the merger price reflects 
the fair value of the acquired shares.”89 Leveraged buyouts, which are 
sometimes not adequately shopped to the market, may also raise 
concerns about possible conflicts of interest because target firm 
managers could seek to preserve their jobs after the transaction closes 
or a private equity buyer may seek to hire them to run the firm. 
Appraisal arbitrage may act to protect shareholders from being 
shortchanged in a sale of control in these circumstances. 
Second, appraisal, as it is currently structured, should be 
unattractive to shareholders with minimal stakes in the target firm. 
Given the great expense involved in fully litigating an appraisal action 
and the absence of a class action mechanism, small shareholders 
generally will not find appraisal to be cost effective.90 If such cases are 
being filed and settled, as Jiang and her coauthors show, then it seems 
likely that they are nuisance litigation. At least that seems to be the 
conclusion reached by the Delaware Council of the Corporation Law 
Section (the “Corporate Council”) when it proposed a de minimis 
exception to the appraisal statute. The group was considering a 
proposal that would impose limits on the remedy unless “the total 
number of shares entitled to appraisal exceeds 1% of the outstanding 
number of shares that could have sought appraisal; or	.	.	.	the value of 
the merger consideration for the total number of shares entitled to 
appraisal exceeds $1 million.”91 On June 16, 2016, Delaware enacted 
this change to its appraisal statute.92 
 
 89. Id. 
 90. Indeed, small investors will benefit, if at all, from this appraisal litigation only if 
there is an ex ante effect from the potential for appraisal litigation on an acquirers’ 
original pricing of the deal. 
 91. COUNCIL OF THE CORP. LAW SECTION, supra note 88, at 3–4. 
 92. Act of June 16, 2016, ch. 265, sec. 11, §	262(h), 80 Del. Laws __, __ (codified at 
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §	262(h)); Amendments to Delaware General Corporation Law 
Will Affect Appraisal Actions and “Intermediate-Form” Mergers, ROPES & GRAY LLP 
(June 20, 2016), https://www.ropesgray.com/newsroom/alerts/2016/June/Amendments-to-
Delaware-General-Corporation-Law-Will-Affect-Appraisal-Actions.aspx [https://perma.cc
/ULW2-PTFE]. 
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This discussion raises an important empirical question: What 
type of appraisal cases are being filed and brought to trial or, if they 
are settled, what are the terms of those settlements? Korsmo and 
Myers have collected data on cases that are tried in the Delaware 
Chancery Court, but this constitutes a small subset of all appraisal 
cases filed.93 Jiang and her coauthors have provided data on a subset 
of these cases in which the terms of the settlements are disclosed. 
They found that the size of the shareholder’s stake in the target 
company is the best predictor of whether a case will go to trial.94 
However, most of these cases are settled, and the terms of these 
settlements are private.95 Without this information, it cannot be 
predicted confidently what appraisal will look like in the future and 
whether it will continue to grow into an important shareholder 
monitoring mechanism. 
C. Hedge Fund Activism Reinvigorates the Market for Corporate 
Control and Replaces Acquisition-Oriented Class Actions as an 
Effective Monitoring Technique 
The Delaware Supreme Court’s Time-Warner96 decision 
substantially weakened the market for corporate control when it 
made clear that the court would not force target companies to redeem 
their poison pills in the face of a non-coercive, fairly-priced hostile 
tender offer.97 This was followed by that same court’s Unitrin98 
decision that greatly reduced an acquirer’s ability to win proxy 
contests for corporate control.99 Similarly, Delaware upholds the 
impregnable defensive combination of a staggered board and poison 
pill.100 Such doctrinal developments put a thumb on the scale—
favoring managers. An accompanying decline of the hostile takeover 
removed this disciplining force so that managerial agency costs rose. 
When shareholder M&A litigation failed to fill the gap created, a 
space opened for shareholder activists to attack these increasing 
levels of managerial agency costs. Beginning in earnest in the early 
 
 93. See Charles Korsmo & Minor Myers, Reforming Modern Appraisal Litigation, 41 
DEL. J. CORP. L. (forthcoming 2016) (manuscript at 9–10), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3
/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2712088 [https://perma.cc/G89Q-8543 (staff-uploaded archive)]. 
 94. Jiang et al., supra note 70, at 5, 29–30. 
 95. Id. at 4, 9. 
 96. See Paramount Commc’ns, Inc. v. Time, Inc., 571 A.2d 1140, 1154–55 (Del. 1990). 
 97. Randall S. Thomas, Judicial Review of Defensive Tactics in Proxy Contests: When 
Is Using a Rights Plan Right?, 46 VAND. L. REV. 503, 516–17 (1993). 
 98. See Unitrin, Inc. v. Am. Gen. Corp., 651 A.2d 1361 (Del. 1995). 
 99. See id. at 1389–90. 
 100. See Air Prods. & Chems., Inc. v. Airgas, Inc., 16 A.3d 48, 54–55 (Del. Ch. 2011). 
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2000s, a wave of hedge fund activism hit the United States, leading to 
an increased level of M&A activity among targeted firms.101 
In recent years, hedge funds have actively engaged many 
companies in an effort to boost shareholder value.102 Empirical 
studies find that the filing of an activist hedge fund’s Schedule 13D 
creates positive average cumulative abnormal returns from 7% to 
8%.103 The filings reflect that hedge funds often accumulate 6% to 
10% of the target company’s stock,104 which in addition to triggering 
the filing, also provides sufficient ownership to give them a strong 
negotiating position if target management resists their efforts. 
Moreover, other hedge funds and many less active institutional 
investors, including some who have direct investments in the lead 
hedge fund, will vote their shares in the target company in support of 
the lead hedge fund.105 The combined effects of direct stock 
ownership and support from other investors have enabled top hedge 
funds to aggressively pursue the creation of shareholder value.106 
That such value is created invites an important question: Where 
do the gains reflected in the stock market price increase originate? 
One line of research finds that much of the gains generated by hedge 
fund activism arise out of the increased likelihood that targeted firms 
will be sold or engage in spinoffs.107 For example, Robin Greenwood 
and Michael Schor found that activist hedge funds’ returns are largely 
produced by takeover premiums.108 Another recent article finds that 
in the second wave of activism running from 2008 to the present, the 
 
 101. See Robin Greenwood & Michael Schor, Investor Activism and Takeovers, 92 J. 
FIN. ECON. 362, 364, 365 tbl.1 (2009). 
 102. Brav et al., supra note 15, 1741. 
 103. Id. at 1730. 
 104. See Lucian A. Bebchuk et al., Pre-Disclosure Accumulations by Activist Investors: 
Evidence and Policy, 39 J. CORP. L. 1, 4–5, 15 (2013).  
 105. See Edelman et al., supra note 15, at 1414; Gilson & Gordon, supra note 15, at 
913–14. 
 106. See C.N.V. Krishnan, Frank Partnoy & Randall S. Thomas, The Second Wave of 
Hedge Fund Activism: The Importance of Reputation, Clout, and Expertise, 40 J. CORP. 
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 107. See Alon Brav, Wei Jiang & Hyunseob Kim, Hedge Fund Activism: A Review, 4 
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a premium price being paid to the target company’s shareholders, the impact of spin-offs is 
more nuanced. Steven Davidoff Solomon, Does a Deal Have the Right Chemistry, or Is It 
Just Financial Engineering?, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 16, 2015, at B5 (noting that “a spinoff has 
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 108. Greenwood & Schor, supra note 101, at 363. Those authors find that activist 
targets which do not result in a takeover have abnormal returns statistically 
indistinguishable from zero. Id. 
95 N.C. L. REV. 19 (2016) 
2016] SHAREHOLDER LITIGATION 41 
largest and most successful hedge funds using a variety of aggressive 
techniques—such as proxy contests for board representation lawsuits 
and media campaigns—force target companies to put themselves up 
for sale.109 Moreover, these successful activists target firms with the 
greatest level of anti-takeover defenses, suggesting they are 
addressing the gap created by the closing of the market for corporate 
control. Thus, the weaknesses in corporate law in effectively 
regulating management antitakeover initiatives are being addressed 
through hedge fund activism. 
Hedge fund activism also acts as a check on poor management 
performance. Poor management can contribute to why target firms 
are generally undervalued by the market. Through their active 
engagement, hedge funds often are able to create value by improving 
the operating performance of these firms. For example, one set of 
researchers found that firms targeted by activists experience a 1.22% 
increase in operating efficiency one year after acquisition.110 
Moreover, another recent paper reports that the most successful 
hedge funds generate substantial improvements in operating 
performance at target firms with one-year post-intervention ROA 
growth of 9.24%, sales growth of 2.54%, and R&D investment growth 
of 3.42%.111 This suggests an additional path by which hedge fund 
activism combats managerial slack. 
Corporate management and its supporters have a less rosy view 
of hedge fund activism: they argue that hedge funds are pursuing 
short-term profits at the expense of the long-term investors in 
targeted companies.112 Some advocates of this position have gone so 
 
 109. Krishnan et al., supra note 106, at 297. 
 110. Christopher P. Clifford, Value Creation or Destruction? Hedge Funds as 
Shareholder Activists, 14 J. CORP. FIN. 323, 324 (2008); see also Brav et al., supra note 15, 
at 1772. 
 111. See Krishnan et al., supra note 106, at 309 tbl.9. Finally, in these interventions, 
hedge funds frequently seek to force companies to pay out dividends or buy back shares as 
a means of distributing to shareholders “excess cash.” Brav et al., supra note 15, at 1741. 
However, these capital structure changes do not appear to be the source of the market 
gains associated with hedge fund activism. See id. at 1771–73; Greenwood & Schor, supra 
note 101, at 371. Rather, just as the Miller and Modigliani theorem predicts, they are just a 
reshuffling of firm’s capital structure that does little to affect firm value. See Franco 
Modigliani & Merton H. Miller, The Cost of Capital, Corporation Finance and the Theory 
of Investment, 48 AM. ECON. REV. 261, 279 (1958) (stating that “a firm cannot reduce the 
cost of capital	.	.	.	by securing part of its capital through the sale of bonds”).  
 112. Martin Lipton, Deconstructing American Business II and Some Thoughts for 
Boards of Directors in 2007, NAT’L LEGAL CTR. FOR PUB. INT., Dec. 2006, at 1, 1 (noting 
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95 N.C. L. REV. 19 (2016) 
42 NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 95 
far as to argue that hedge fund shareholders ought to have fiduciary 
duties to other shareholders as a check on their allegedly 
opportunistic conduct.113 Yet, the data reviewed above shows that at 
least during a one-year time period there are performance 
improvements, and no one has yet published peer-reviewed research 
finding a longer-term problem.114 
There are several other reasons to question the claim that hedge 
funds are short-term profit oriented. First, hedge funds seem to have 
little trouble recruiting institutional investors to support their activist 
goals.115 If hedge funds’ plans only produced short-term gains at the 
expense of long-term profitability, these long-term investors would be 
reluctant to support them.116 Second, activist hedge fund holding 
periods average approximately twenty-one months,117 which is 
substantially longer than almost all other investors. Finally, one study 
of hedge fund interventions from 1994 to 2007 finds that the stock 
price gains accompanying the initial announcement of a hedge fund’s 
activism were sustained over a five-year period, as were 
improvements in other measures of returns.118 Taken together, this 
 
Myth That Insulating Boards Serves Long-Term Value, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 1637, 1663–64 
(2013) (arguing against claims that activist investors take profitable short term actions that 
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STAN. L. REV. 1255, 1295–96 (2008). 
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requirements, with average shares amounting to less than ten percent, which is contrary to 
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evidence, both pro and con, of claims that investors with a short-term perspective are 
harming corporations before ultimately rejecting these arguments). 
 115. For a list of those parties from which hedge funds seek support, see Kahan & 
Rock, supra note 67, at 1089. 
 116. Id. at 1088. 
 117. See William W. Bratton, Hedge Funds and Governance Targets, 95 GEO. L.J. 1375, 
1420 tbl.VIII (2007).  
 118. See Bebchuk, Brav & Jiang, Long-Term Effects, supra note 114, at 1123–30; see 
also Nicole M. Boyson & Robert M. Mooradian, Experienced Hedge Fund Activists 2–3 
(Apr. 3, 2012) (unpublished manuscript), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm
?abstract_id=1787649 [https://perma.cc/WBW6-AXS6 (staff-uploaded archive)] (finding 
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evidence supports the claim that hedge fund activism is not 
dominated by short-term considerations but rather generates valuable 
monitoring of corporate management.119 
Private equity firms interact in important ways with hedge funds 
and facilitate hedge fund activism. One hedge fund strategy that 
generates substantial shareholder value is persuading targeted firms 
to put themselves up for sale, often to private equity firms.120 These 
sales are generally at substantial premiums over the prior market 
prices and act to discipline management of underperforming 
companies as well as create ongoing pressure on managers at other 
(potentially targeted) firms to aggressively maximize shareholder 
value. 
Overall, activist hedge funds, sometimes working with private 
equity firms, have been able to fill the shareholder monitoring 
function of the market for corporate control. This serves as a second 
example of how increasingly concentrated share ownership makes for 
more efficient shareholder monitoring of managerial agency costs. In 
combination with a slightly increased role for the appraisal remedy in 
the hands of appraisal arbitrageurs, these changes have largely offset 
the decline in the monitoring value of acquisition-oriented 
shareholder class actions and the decline of the hostile takeover. 
II.  WORKING AROUND THE WEAKNESSES OF DERIVATIVE SUITS AS 
MONITORS OF EXECUTIVE PAY 
Derivative suits are another type of representative litigation that 
shareholders can use as a monitoring device. Traditional derivative 
cases raise state law breach of fiduciary duty claims against directors 
and officers.121 Typically, these claims allege breach of the duties of 
loyalty (including good faith) and care as well as other state law 
violations.122 They are commonly used to attack directors or officers 
engaging in conflict of interest transactions with the corporation or 
taking corporate opportunities belonging to the corporation.123 Small 
shareholders can bring these actions on behalf of the corporation in a 
 
that hedge fund activism can improve long-term performance for target firms and hedge 
funds). 
 119. See Davidoff, supra note 112, at B5; see also Dionysia Katelouzou, Myths and 
Realities of Hedge Fund Activism: Some Empirical Evidence, 7 VA. L. & BUS. REV. 459, 
479 (2013) (finding that hedge funds are not short term in their focus). 
 120. See Greenwood & Schor, supra note 101, at 372. 
 121. See COX & HAZEN, supra note 57, §	15.02, at 423–24. 
 122. See id. 
 123. See id. 
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representative capacity; because they are focused primarily on abuses 
within a single self-dealing transaction, they customarily do not 
involve sums that are significant vis-à-vis the total value of the firm.124 
Hence, complaints claim that derivative suits are abusive, as they are 
prosecuted by investors with a small stake in the suit’s outcome and 
produce results unlikely to impact overall shareholder wealth.125 
Among the broad group of shareholder suits, derivative suit 
litigation consists of the most stable set of cases. There has been little 
change in the underlying set of legal and procedural rules for 
derivative litigation in the past twenty years. In prior research, one of 
the authors studied all derivative litigation filed in Delaware during 
1999 and 2000.126 The study found that Delaware public companies 
were hit with about thirty cases per year, with about thirty percent of 
them yielding relief to the corporation or its shareholders and the 
remainder being quickly dismissed with little litigation activity.127 
Private Delaware firms were targeted with a dozen lawsuits annually, 
typically raising claims of minority oppression.128 
This research shows that a careful distinction must be made 
between public and private corporations when discussing the role of 
shareholder derivative suits. Derivative suits are very much alive and 
well in the public company setting. In this context, they perform their 
historical function of remedying breaches of the duty of loyalty—
customarily in the form of acts in bad faith and, more particularly, 
self-dealing practices. In the close corporation context, they are better 
seen as remedying opportunistic behavior by those in control. 
A. The Derivative Suit’s Impotence to Address Excessive 
Compensation 
One troubling area for the derivative suit as a governor for self-
interested conduct is executive compensation. Whether one views 
executive pay as an endemic problem with American corporate 
governance129 or a more isolated problem involving a few bad 
 
 124. See Coffee, supra note 10, at 677–78. 
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 126. See Robert B. Thompson & Randall S. Thomas, The Public and Private Faces of 
Derivative Lawsuits, 57 VAND. L. REV. 1747, 1760–61 (2004). 
 127. Id. at 1749–50. 
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apples,130 most experts agree that the derivative suit has been a weak 
tool to address executive compensation concerns.131 As developed 
below, the derivative suit is hobbled both procedurally and 
substantively when directed at alleged excessive executive 
compensation.132 
The procedural impediment results from a major feature of the 
derivative suit: the requirement that the plaintiff must either make a 
demand on the board of directors or establish a basis for why such a 
demand would be futile.133 The outcome in either case ultimately 
depends on whether the court believes the board, or a subcommittee 
of the board, is sufficiently independent of alleged wrongdoing in the 
suit so that the board’s opinion that the suit fails to serve a corporate 
interest will be upheld by the reviewing court. As a consequence of 
the demand requirement, there exists a very large boneyard 
comprised of failed derivative suits challenging executive 
compensation in public companies. 
In the case of private corporations, the disputes are largely 
between the “ins” and the “outs,” making the demand requirement 
much less lethal because the alleged wrongdoing at the heart of the 
suit frequently can be more easily linked to a majority of the board. 
In contrast, the public company’s board is dominated by outside 
directors, so there is a healthy presumption of independence with 
respect to whether the suit furthers the corporate interest as well as 
the substantive appropriateness of the compensation package. The 
board itself is further protected from claims of overpaying executives 
by the widespread adoption of immunity shields whereby a provision 
in the firm’s articles of incorporation insulates directors from liability 
for misconduct that is not a breach of the duty of loyalty, illegal, in 
bad faith, or a knowing violation of the law.134 Immunity shields thus 
limit suits against directors that allege such a managerial failure to 
claims that the directors had knowingly engaged in systematic 
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breaches on the part of the board. It is unimaginable that such a claim 
can be successful in an environment in which executive compensation 
packages arise from a multistep process that involves external 
consultants, human resource professionals, and a deliberative process 
of at least a committee of the board. A claim of this nature is even 
more difficult to mount because the entire process is guided by 
counsel who will assure that steps are taken to ensure that 
compensation is set in a manner consistent with the desired image of 
due deliberation. 
The derivative suit has not always been impotent in confronting 
executive compensation.135 During the Great Depression, a good deal 
of litigation ensued, successfully attacking bonus and incentive 
compensation policies of large public companies.136 The leading case 
of the day, Rogers v. Hill,137 held that compensation received by the 
firm’s president and directors was large enough to merit investigation 
as to whether it was misuse under the bylaws.138 Rogers reasoned that 
stockholder support and a presumption of regularity and continuity 
concerning the bylaws 
cannot	.	.	.	be used to justify payments of sums as salaries so 
large as in substance and effect to amount to spoliation or waste 
of corporate property.	.	.	. “If a bonus payment has no relation 
to the value of the services for which it is given, it is in reality a 
gift in part and the majority stockholders have no power to give 
away corporate property	.	.	.	.”139 
Rogers thus reflected the then-contemporary approach to assess the 
overall reasonableness of the compensation package. In current 
times, given the requirement that a majority of directors be 
independent at listed public companies, the barest approval by a 
majority of the board of directors insulates executive compensation.140 
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Illustrative of the high substantive protection executive 
compensation enjoys from challenges by shareholders is the recent 
decision of the Delaware Supreme Court, Freedman v. Adams.141 A 
shareholder derivative suit was initiated to recover more than $130 
million in bonuses approved by the board of XTO Energy Inc.142 The 
plan lacked performance-based standards, a requirement by section 
162(m) of the Internal Revenue Code for compensation in excess of 
$1 million to be a deductible business expense on XTO Energy’s tax 
return.143 After the plaintiff initiated the derivative suit, complaining 
that the lack of any performance benchmarks had the consequence of 
raising the corporation’s taxes, the board prospectively modified the 
plan and the plaintiff dropped her suit.144 In responding to the 
plaintiff’s request for an award of attorneys’ fees incident to the 
claim, XTO Energy argued that the board was fully aware of section 
162(m) but made a conscious decision not to avail itself of that section 
because it believed its approach to compensation decisions should not 
be constrained by such a plan.145 The court denied any award of fees 
to the plaintiff because it held that a claim for waste had not been 
stated.146 The court reasoned that “[e]ven if the decision was a poor 
one,” as alleged by the plaintiff, “it was not unconscionable or 
irrational.”147 In other words, the court held that the plaintiff had not 
established waste, even when the board of directors gave up an easily 
available tax deduction in exchange for no apparent benefit to the 
corporation. 
In addition to the weak substantive standards in the regulation of 
executive compensation, a derivative suit plaintiff typically faces 
insurmountable procedural barriers in attacking compensation.148 
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Derivative suits challenging an executive’s compensation are 
regularly rejected on the ground of “failure to make a demand” on 
the board of directors. Under the orthodox view, a demand is excused 
on grounds of futility, which requires evidence that either (1) the 
compensation is so egregious as to be beyond the protection of the 
business judgment rule or (2) the plaintiff has alleged with sufficient 
particularity that a majority of the board of directors lacks sufficient 
independence from the suit, or the suit’s defendants, to render an 
impartial decision on whether the suit’s continuance would be in the 
corporation’s best interest.149 Moreover, even if a demand is excused 
on the grounds that it is futile, the board of directors can resurrect its 
ability to interdict the derivative suit by creating a special litigation 
committee of independent directors who can thereby provide an 
independent voice on whether the suit’s continuance is in the best 
interest of the company.150 
Thus, litigation through the derivative suit is not, and for some 
time has not been, a credible check on executive compensation in 
public companies. To the extent directors feel constrained in their 
executive pay decisions, they act out of concerns that do not include 
the fear of litigation. In this space, the Say on Pay mechanism 
assumes great importance. 
B. Say on Pay 
Excessive compensation payments to top corporate executives 
are a sign of managerial agency costs. Good corporate governance 
supports arguments in favor of effective shareholder monitoring of 
these payments. As noted, shareholder derivative suits have proven 
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largely impotent to either redress or retard executive compensation 
abuses. Executive pay challenges, even when coupled with 
suggestions of influence by a dominant controlling stockholder, are 
crushed by the deference accorded boards of directors under the 
procedural and substantive derivative suit requirements.151 
The federally mandated Say on Pay vote by shareholders is a 
recent regulatory initiative designed to bolster shareholder 
monitoring of executive compensation practices.152 In the United 
States, Say on Pay was adopted when Congress passed the Dodd-
Frank Act of 2010; Dodd-Frank required, among other things, that 
each U.S. public company hold an advisory shareholder vote on the 
compensation of its top executives.153 In the first set of such votes, 
held during the 2011 proxy season, shareholders strongly supported 
existing pay practices at most firms with Say on Pay votes getting an 
average of 91.2% of shareholder support.154 The average support 
levels remained high in subsequent years, with more than three-
quarters of companies in the Russell 3000 receiving at least 90% 
shareholder support in 2012 and 2013.155 At the other end of the 
spectrum, only 1% to 2% of firms (forty to sixty firms of the Russell 
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3000) received less than 50% shareholder support during the 2011 
proxy season.156 
Small institutional shareholders tend to be more likely than 
larger ones to vote against management’s Say on Pay proposals,157 
perhaps because of their lack of alternative methods for confronting 
management with their opinions. Furthermore, when ownership is 
more dispersed, the Say on Pay vote “provides an opportunity for 
many small institutional shareholders to coordinate, and to voice a 
unified opinion” about management’s pay.158 However, on occasion, 
large shareholders have joined smaller shareholders in expressing 
their displeasure with unjustifiable pay. 
Although there have not been a large number of negative votes, 
Say on Pay votes can be seen as having a significant effect on 
American corporate governance.159 Dodd-Frank’s mandated 
shareholder votes focus directors on shareholders’ concerns about 
executive pay, increase shareholder participation in corporate 
governance, and open lines of communication between management 
and shareholders (and proxy advisory firms) regarding executive 
compensation.160 Multiple forces unleashed by mandated Say on Pay 
votes have caused management at many companies to make changes 
to the substance and disclosure of their pay programs in an attempt to 
more clearly align pay to performance.161 Many companies have also 
revised the content of the Compensation Discussion and Analysis 
(CD&A) filed with the annual meeting proxy materials.162 
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Meanwhile, at companies whose pay programs received negative Say 
on Pay recommendations by proxy advisory firms, most boards took a 
variety of steps to engage shareholders following an “against” 
recommendation.163 
Since the introduction of Say on Pay as a regulatory tool on U.S. 
public companies, scholars have conducted multiple studies that 
measure the effects it has on corporate actions and executive pay. 
One interesting new line of research on Say on Pay’s monitoring 
effects finds that  
companies that have a non-insider blockholder and receive low 
support rates for the SOP vote are significantly more likely to: 
(1) pick more reasonable (modest) peer-companies for 
determining executive compensation, (2) decrease the growth 
rate of the excess compensation, and (3) experience CEO 
turnover within 12 months of the SOP vote, relative to 
companies that do not have a non-insider blockholder.164  
This suggests that Say on Pay is most effective when a large 
blockholder serves as a “reluctant watchdog.”165 
Yet, in the United States, studies have suggested that Say on Pay 
has not led to lower executive pay levels or to changes in its 
composition.166 Research on the United Kingdom has also found that 
overall CEO pay levels do not seem to have changed as a result of 
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Say on Pay votes.167 However, internationally, Ricardo Correa and 
Ugur Lel have found that pay growth rates are lower in their 
comparative study of countries that have adopted Say on Pay 
legislation.168 Their cross-country study of thirty-nine nations—twelve 
that have adopted Say on Pay and twenty-seven that have not—finds 
that although “CEO compensation has increased in several [Say on 
Pay] countries, including the United States and the United Kingdom, 
the growth in CEO pay is higher [in countries] not subject to [Say on 
Pay] laws.”169 
In sum, Say on Pay acts as a low-cost monitoring measure for 
shareholder groups and has some impact on executive compensation 
abuses. While it does not have a dramatic effect on compensation 
levels or composition, it has shifted corporate governance patterns, 
leading to more interaction between management and shareholders 
over compensation issues. Smaller institutional investors have been 
more willing to vote against management pay packages, but Say on 
Pay’s biggest effects take course when large outside blockholders join 
smaller institutional investors in voting “no” on excessive 
compensation packages. Finally, the up-to-date data supports the 
intuition that a periodic Say on Pay vote and the dialogue it prompts 
with proxy advisors and large blockholders diminish the rate of 
compensation increases from what would be the case were there no 
Say on Pay vote requirement. 
C. Hedge Fund Activism and Executive Compensation 
While Say on Pay is a low-cost shareholder monitoring technique 
that has had relatively limited effects, shareholder monitoring of 
excessive executive compensation can also come in higher impact 
forms, such as through the market for corporate control. During the 
1980s, many bust-up takeovers were motivated in part by claims that 
target company managers were entrenched in power and helping 
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themselves to overly generous amounts of compensation. While 
undoubtedly this was not the most important motive for hostile 
acquisitions, it did become a rallying cry for many shareholders.170 
While the 1980s traditional hostile takeover has largely 
disappeared, in recent years, hedge fund activists have targeted firms 
with high levels of executive pay.171 Although this targeting may be 
largely done to attract the support of other investors for other 
initiatives, it has increased the level of management turnover and 
reduced significantly the level of executive compensation at targeted 
firms.172 Alon Brav and others found that in the year that firms were 
targeted by hedge funds, “the CEO compensation in the target 
companies is on average $914,000 higher	.	.	.	than the equivalent 
measure of CEO compensation at peer companies in the same 
industry that are of similar size and stock valuation” but that “[o]ne 
year after hedge fund intervention, CEO pay at targeted firms is not 
distinguishable from peer levels.”173 Compensation form also changed 
with increases in pay-for-performance sensitivity levels.174 
Thus, we argue that derivative litigation’s weaknesses in 
monitoring excessive managerial pay have been compensated by the 
introduction of low cost Say on Pay monitoring and by the rapid 
expansion of higher impact hedge fund activism.175 This statement 
leads to the question: Are there other areas where derivative 
litigation is failing, and if so, what monitoring techniques may be 
taking its place? 
III.  THE DERIVATIVE SUIT AND STEWARDSHIP OF THE FIRM 
In contrast to its low impact in policing executive compensation, 
derivative suit litigation remains a viable medium within a narrow 
area at public companies—the so-called “failure to oversee” claims 
against the board. Such claims find their source in former Chancellor 
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Allen’s path-breaking Caremark176 decision, holding that directors’ 
duty of good faith is breached when there is evidence of a “sustained 
or systematic failure of a director to exercise reasonable oversight.”177 
A. “Failure to Oversee” Claims in Derivative Suits 
A dramatic instance of such a suit is In re Massey Energy 
Company Derivative and Class Action Litigation.178 In that case, the 
court noted that the complaint would have survived a motion to 
dismiss by alleging facts reflecting that the board repeatedly ignored 
reports and sanctions of mine safety violations in the years preceding 
the explosion in its Upper Big Branch mine that killed twenty-nine 
miners—the deadliest mine accident in the United States in forty 
years.179 
But, absent such dramatic pre-disaster warnings as occurred in 
Massey, failure of oversight claims confront two important bulwarks 
that protect directors—the ubiquitous immunity shield provision and 
the demand requirement. Unless the claims of lack of oversight rise to 
the level of a purposeful abandonment, as contrasted with a breach 
sounding in negligence, the standard immunity shield insulates the 
offending directors from liability. There is frequently insufficient 
evidence on which to conclude that the board has engaged in more 
than negligent oversight, and therefore, the immunity shield often 
insulates the board from liability. 
Indeed, the Delaware judiciary has concluded that ignoring red 
flags may not even rise to the level of director negligence. To 
illustrate, consider In re Citigroup Inc. Shareholder Derivative 
Litigation,180 which held that the business judgment rule insulated the 
directors against claims that they failed to take precautions to protect 
against losses from Citigroup’s large exposure to the subprime 
lending markets.181 The suit alleged ample red flags that should have 
caught the board’s eye, such as an economist’s forecast that a 
speculative bubble was nearing its end, a leading subprime lender 
closing its 229 offices, another lender filing bankruptcy, analysts 
downgrading subprime mortgages, and a warning of increasing 
subprime delinquencies by another lender.182  
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Nevertheless, the court reasoned, 
The “red flags”	.	.	.	amount to little more than portions of public 
documents that reflected the worsening conditions in the 
subprime mortgage market and in the economy generally. 
Plaintiffs fail to plead “particularized facts suggesting that the 
Board was presented with ‘red flags’ alerting it to potential 
misconduct”	.	.	.	.	[The plaintiffs] repeatedly make the 
conclusory allegation that the defendants have breached their 
duty of oversight, but nowhere do [they] adequately explain 
what the director defendants actually did or failed to do that 
would constitute such a violation. Even while admitting that 
Citigroup had a risk monitoring system in place, plaintiffs seem 
to conclude that, because the director defendants	.	.	.	were 
charged with monitoring Citigroup’s risk, then they must be 
found liable because Citigroup experienced losses as a result of 
exposure to the subprime mortgage market. The only factual 
support plaintiffs provide for this conclusion are “red flags” 
that actually amount to nothing more than signs of continuing 
deterioration in the subprime mortgage market. These types of 
conclusory allegations are exactly the kinds of allegations that 
do not state a claim for relief under Caremark.183 
The above reasoning appears consistent with the observation 
made in a widely-noted Delaware Supreme Court decision, In re The 
Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litigation,184 that conduct offending good 
corporate governance practices nonetheless is not inherently 
negligent conduct.185 Thus, the immunity shield requires that the 
derivative suit plaintiff show that the board was more than merely 
negligent, and the plaintiff must prove a high standard of fault to even 
show that directors acted negligently. These two principles, in 
tandem, severely restrict the scope of the derivative duty to monitor 
suits. 
Indeed, the division between Massey and Citigroup may be that 
Citigroup involved a challenge to legitimate business practices, 
whereas Massey is riveted, as was Caremark, on the directors’ 
conscious disregard of the corporation’s adherence with the law when 
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implementing business strategies. After all, Chancellor Allen’s 
opinion emphasized the important role that compliance programs had 
assumed for U.S. corporations when he justified departing from the 
earlier Delaware precedent that expressly relieved directors of the 
need to superintend the corporation’s systems to assure compliance 
with the law.186 Even if this is the means to distinguish the conflicting 
results reached in Massey and Citigroup, the facts required to satisfy 
even Massey reflect such an abandonment of the directors’ 
monitoring role as to suggest outright complicity in the lawless acts 
rather than a want of oversight. As such, Caremark appears cabined 
to the extremes of corporate misbehavior.187 
B. Where Federal Securities Class Actions Do Not Wither: 
Management Stewardship 
Another potential avenue for shareholder monitoring of failures 
in management stewardship is through securities fraud class actions. 
The story of few trials and many tribulations of federal securities class 
actions is well understood. At first glance, these suits appear poorly 
placed to assume a greater role in providing shareholder monitoring 
of managerial oversight. For one thing, the number of such suits has 
been declining in recent years. Cornerstone Research, a litigation 
support group, reported that even though the total securities class 
action filings in 2015 (189) were the most since 2008, filings against 
companies within the S&P 500 remained well below historical 
averages.188 More generally, the number of securities class action 
filings in 2013, although in line with the immediate two preceding 
years, was thirteen percent below the historical average number of 
annual filings.189 At least since 2005, the trend line in filings has been 
downward.190 
With the decline in securities fraud class action filings, there has 
been a concomitant decline in the number of settlements reached 
each year. While the average number of settlements from 1996–2013 
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is 124 per year, there were just ninety-four in 2012.191 While these 
downward declines were occurring, median settlement size increased 
from $5.6 million in 1996 to $9.3 million in 2013 (although declining to 
$6.5 million in 2014, albeit after years of noticeable increases).192 This 
increase in median settlement size supports the claim that plaintiffs 
are more discriminating in the cases they file, focusing on suits likely 
to compensate them for the costs and risks of securities class action 
litigation that are cataloged below. 
The high risk incident to filing a securities class action is 
embodied in a single data point: the pre-trial dismissal rate of filed 
suits. In 1996, a year after Congress introduced a variety of 
procedural changes intended to reduce the frequency of securities 
suits, forty-three securities class actions were dismissed; whereas, in 
2013, in an era when many fewer securities class actions were being 
filed, eighty suits were dismissed.193 Overall, as of 2014, approximately 
forty-two percent of filed securities class actions were dismissed in 
response to defendants’ motions to dismiss or motions for summary 
judgment.194 At the core of these trend lines is the cost curve for the 
suits’ maintenance. Those costs have, not surprisingly, been impacted 
by several legal, legislative, and judicial developments. 
However, securities fraud class actions are ill-suited for 
monitoring managerial agency costs for other reasons as well. 
Doctrinally, the seeds of eviscerating the antifraud provision’s 
potential to address managerial agency costs were sown in the 1960s 
and 1970s when the Supreme Court sought to curb the ever-
expanding scope of Rule 10b-5 by ruling that it could not address 
“instances of corporate mismanagement.”195 This phrase arose from 
the Birnbaum v. Newport Steel Corp.196 opinion, where the gravamen 
of the complaint was that the controlling stockholder thwarted an 
ongoing acquisition of the company at a premium so that he could 
garner the entire control premium for himself.197 The defendant’s 
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misconduct in Birnbaum was ultimately addressed under state law as 
a breach of the controlling stockholder’s fiduciary duty.198 However, 
Birnbaum reasoned that the antifraud provision reached only fraud in 
connection with a plaintiff’s own purchase or sale and did not extend 
to breaches of fiduciary duty by managers or controlling stockholders 
absent such a connection with a plaintiff’s actual purchase or sale.199 
Later, the Supreme Court in Santa Fe Industries, Inc. v. Green200 
would take a similar position in holding that alleged unfairness, 
absent deception, in connection with a forced sale of securities held 
by minority holders was outside the scope of the antifraud 
provision.201 The sine qua non for a violation of the securities laws, 
therefore, is a material deception; an egregious breach of fiduciary 
obligation absent deception is not within the reach of the antifraud 
provision.202 Thus, with the one exception discussed below, the 
antifraud provision has not just been relegated to a rear seat for 
claims of fiduciary misconduct; it has not even been in the vehicle 
carrying these shareholder complaints to settlement or judgment. 
Despite the significant narrowing of the antifraud provision, 
there has been a growing use of it to redress lapses in management 
oversight.203 Given all of the obstacles that shareholders face in 
bringing these cases,204 resorting to private suit under the securities 
laws to address oversight situations is an indictment of the 
comparative weakness of state law mechanisms to curb this variety of 
managerial agency cost. As seen earlier, a state fiduciary duty claim 
that the directors and officers were poor stewards must confront not 
only the business judgment rule’s strong presumption of propriety but 
also, more importantly, the additional protection provided the 
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board’s decision by the available immunity shield provision.205 The 
effect of the immunity shield is to force the suit’s focus toward the 
responsible officers rather than the outside directors.206 So focused, 
the derivative suit plaintiff confronts an even greater obstacle: the 
demand requirement, whereby a decision by the independent 
directors that the suit is not in the corporation’s best interest scuttles 
the suit. In combination, oversight failures and harmful stewardship 
escape scrutiny under state law except in the extreme instances of 
conscious abandonment of compliance with the law, as illustrated in 
Massey.207 The vacuum created by the weakness of the state law based 
derivative suit has been filled by the federal securities law antifraud 
provision, even if not a perfect fit. 
At first, the path for securities fraud class actions challenging 
managerial oversight lapses was unclear. After Santa Fe Industries, 
absent a materially misleading statement, the antifraud provision is 
not violated.208 However, investors could proceed when they could 
identify misrepresentations anchored in management’s failed 
stewardship and the accompanying lapses in board oversight. Many of 
the actionable statements are the consequence of the SEC’s 
Management Discussion and Analysis (MD&A) provision that 
mandates SEC filings, among other MD&A requirements, to set forth 
“any known trends or uncertainties	.	.	.	the registrant reasonably 
expects will have a material	.	.	.	impact.”209 
The demands of this requirement were recently strengthened by 
a Second Circuit decision holding that failure to comply with the 
requirement is a material omission, as the natural implication of 
making a disclosure of a known trend or uncertainty is that the trend 
or uncertainty does not exist.210 More generally, management, 
certainly within regulated industries, proffers statements of the firm’s 
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compliance with prevailing legal requirements or offers opinions 
about the firm’s business strategies and operations as it seeks to meet 
the ongoing regulatory and competitive challenges that confront the 
firm. These statements are attuned to well-understood investor 
concerns about the effect of regulation and competition on the firm. 
Investors value management’s reassurances, but these reassurances 
are often tainted by over-optimism that appears to abound among 
managers.211 Within this informational environment, the Supreme 
Court’s most recent antifraud decision allows Rule 10b-5 to play an 
expanded role in addressing failures of stewardship. 
In Omnicare, Inc. v. Laborer’s District Council Construction 
Industry Pension Fund,212 the Supreme Court established the template 
for how management opinion statements regarding its policies, 
practices, and oversight are actionable under the antifraud 
provision.213 In its registration statement for a public offering of its 
securities, Omnicare stated management “believe[d]” its various 
contracts were “in compliance with applicable federal and state laws” 
and “legally and economically valid arrangements.”214 The belief was 
misplaced, as subsequent to the public offering, several federal 
enforcement suits were initiated against Omnicare alleging that 
multiple aspects of its contractual relationships and business 
arrangements violated federal health care laws.215 Purchasers of the 
registered securities thereafter initiated the class action suit and 
alleged they had been misled by the false opinion of legal 
compliance.216 
The premise of Omnicare is that “a reasonable investor may, 
depending on the circumstances, understand an opinion statement to 
convey facts about how the speaker has formed the opinion	.	.	.	.	[I]f 
the real facts are otherwise, but not provided, the opinion statement 
will mislead its audience.”217 Omnicare’s template analyzes 
management’s opinions regarding its performance, policies, and 
practices through the lens of whether the opinion expressed is a half-
truth, meaning the opinion is actionable because in light of the total 
circumstances management omitted facts necessary to prevent the 
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statement from being materially misleading. This formulation is 
captured by the Court’s illustration: 
Consider an unadorned statement of opinion about legal 
compliance: “We believe our conduct is lawful.” If the issuer 
makes that statement without having consulted a lawyer, it 
could be misleadingly incomplete.	.	.	.	[A]n investor, though 
recognizing that legal opinions can prove wrong in the end, still 
likely expects such an assertion to rest on some meaningful 
legal inquiry	.	.	.	. Similarly, if the issuer made the statement in 
the face of its lawyers’ contrary advice, or with knowledge that 
the Federal Government was taking the opposite view, the 
investor again has cause to complain: He expects not just that 
the issuer believes the opinion	.	.	.	but that it fairly aligns with 
the information in the issuer’s possession at the time.218 
Before Omnicare, generalized statements of optimism, such as “our 
conduct is lawful,” were perfunctorily viewed as harmless puffery.219 
The ultimate significance of Omnicare is that the decision invites 
inquiry about whether optimism professed by management is 
nonetheless a half-truth. 
Henceforth, whether mandated or volunteered, when executives 
report on their management oversight and boards report on their 
efforts and systems to monitor management’s stewardship, Omnicare 
will allow potential plaintiffs to police their professed achievements. 
While bad stewardship and poor monitoring will not give rise to 
disciplining of such underperformance by the antifraud provision, 
false representations of the strength of internal systems for assuring 
board oversight and systems for promoting wise stewardship of the 
firm are very much today’s subject of the securities laws. Because 
Omnicare promotes greater transparency around the firm’s 
information and compliance systems, greater effort within the firm is 
expected to assure it is fulfilling its objective of reducing managerial 
agency costs. 
At a minimum, we therefore find that disclosure-oriented federal 
securities suits can address errant stewardship. This can occur where 
the managers proffer bold claims of their compliance with the law, 
that their business strategies are yielding great returns, or that 
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existing contracts will add immensely to future profits when behind 
each assertion is an ongoing violation of federal or state law that upon 
detection and compliance will prove immensely unrewarding to the 
firm. However, outside this realm, the most significant contribution of 
private and public enforcement of the securities laws is the culture of 
compliance they compel.220 Complaints abound that suits, or at least 
most suits, are frivolous and drive up the cost of business transactions. 
Regardless of the accuracy of this claim, it nonetheless supports a 
healthy awareness of the perils of nondisclosure of material 
information in securities transactions, which includes periodic reports 
and other announcements that reach investors. Enforcement, public 
and private, of the securities laws shines a bright light on managers. 
Not only does this result in the therapeutic effect of warding some 
from misbehavior, but it also alerts investors and regulators of facts 
warranting inquiry and perhaps enforcement. And it is a light beamed 
into an area largely vacated by state corporate law. 
C. Hedge Funds and Private Equity Firms Monitor Managerial 
Oversight Failures 
Hedge funds are constantly on the lookout for undervalued 
target firms. Firms that suffer from significant managerial oversight 
failures are likely to experience poor performance and stock price 
declines that will make them targets for activist shareholders. Activist 
hedge funds are more likely to seek to gain board representation at 
these firms, and those that succeed in obtaining board seats will have 
strong incentives to monitor target firm boards and overall firm risk 
levels.221 Furthermore, as noted earlier,222 hedge funds seek to force a 
sale of the target firm in many instances. The threat of hedge fund 
activism is therefore likely to keep corporate management sharply 
focused on any red flags that might signal systemic operational 
weaknesses. 
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Private equity firms are another important monitor of 
managerial oversight failures. For one thing, they stand ready to 
purchase firms that have previously been targeted by hedge funds 
because of large losses from poor managerial oversight. Should that 
occur, corporate management of the newly privatized firm would be 
under the strict scrutiny of a strong board of directors appointed by 
the new controlling shareholder that seeks to ensure the 
maximization of shareholder value so that the private equity firm 
realizes substantial gains on its investment.223 The newly appointed 
private equity directors are highly motivated to perform in this role 
because they have increased levels of pay for performance, work in 
smaller and more focused groups, and can credibly threaten dismissal 
of nonperforming executives.224 As a result, it is expected that they 
would exercise strong managerial oversight with all cost-justified 
internal control systems deployed by the board in an effort to ensure 
firm value is maximized. Thus, if private equity firms take on the 
oversight function, derivative suits will be unnecessary as monitoring 
devices. 
Private equity firms are better risk monitors than public 
company boards for other reasons as well.225 First, management team 
members will have greater equity interest in their firms than their 
public company counterparts, especially at the more junior levels.226 
This gives them stronger incentives to care about firm value and, 
therefore, to more accurately assess the impact on the firm of 
increased risk levels. Second, private equity managers’ equity 
interests are much more sensitive to changes in firm value because of 
the magnifying effects of the relatively high debt burden shouldered 
by their companies.227 This again gives them stronger incentives to 
monitor risk levels. Finally, the more experienced directors that are 
employed by private equity firms will have better information and 
greater ability to control risk levels because they have the backing of 
the control shareholder in doing so. In short, hedge funds and private 
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equity firms are filling a monitoring gap created by the shortcomings 
of derivative litigation. 
CONCLUSION 
Derivative suits and M&A class actions have enjoyed periods of 
great repute as well as tough times when they have been vilified. 
Their usefulness as monitoring devices for managerial agency costs 
has lately been called into question, while courts and legislatures have 
cut back on the scope and long-term viability of these tools. However, 
even as the strength of these forms of litigation has waned, new forms 
of monitoring techniques have emerged. Hedge fund activism, Say on 
Pay votes, securities fraud class actions, private equity firms, and 
appraisal arbitrage have come forth to fill the gaps as potential 
alternative monitoring tools for disgruntled shareholders. 
In this Article, we argue that these two sets of developments are 
related to malfunctions in the market for corporate control, abuses in 
executive compensation practices, and breakdowns in managerial 
oversight. In each case, as managerial agency costs began to spiral 
upward, investors sought ways to reduce them. Hedge fund activism is 
the strongest of these methods at the moment with many well-
documented successes in opening up the market for corporate 
control, curbing executive compensation, and attacking a lack of 
managerial oversight. Say on Pay voting requirements have served 
primarily as a tool to nudge managers to engage with their 
shareholders over issues related to executive compensation, a 
function that derivative litigation has shown itself unable to perform. 
Securities fraud class actions have shown promise as a tool for 
addressing managerial oversight failures as have private equity 
controlled boards of directors. Finally, appraisal arbitrage holds out 
the hope of a better remedy for shareholders that are forced to sell 
their stock in control shareholder squeezeouts. If the Delaware 
legislature can screen out frivolous appraisal strike suits while 
permitting meritorious actions to survive, then appraisal arbitrage 
could provide shareholders with a means of redress when they are 
forced to sell their shares too cheaply, a remedy that was largely lost 
after the Delaware courts decided to apply business judgment 
standard review in many such transactions. 
These new governance responses are influenced by, or created 
out of, the rising concentration of share ownership of public 
companies. It is well documented that share ownership has steadily 
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evolved so that there are now a significant number of large 
blockholders at many public companies.228 This reduces the costs of 
collective action and increases the likelihood that an owner exists who 
will have a sufficient economic interest to embrace governance as a 
wealth-increasing strategy. Hedge fund activism, appraisal arbitrage, 
private equity boards of directors, and even Say on Pay are directly or 
indirectly all the product of greater concentration of equity 
ownership. 
Looking to the future, some evidence suggests that these trends 
will continue. Hedge fund activism seems to be rising to new levels in 
the economy. Private equity buyouts are cyclical in nature, rising to 
higher levels with good economic times but dropping off in times of 
recession, and therefore reflect the strong benefits of concentrated 
ownership over dispersed ownership systems. Furthermore, current 
market trends in the IPO markets show that increasing numbers of 
high profile firms are using dual class stock structures to preserve the 
benefits of concentrated ownership for the newly public companies.229 
All of these forces should lead to higher levels of ownership 
concentration and managerial agency cost reductions as new forms of 
shareholder monitoring develop. 
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